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Plotinus and St. John of the Cross:
Concurrences and Divergencies

We propose to examine here two renowned champions of mysticism, Plotinus
and St. John of the Cross. The former, the third-century Greek philosopher
from Alexandria in northern Egypt, is the father of Neoplatonism. The latter,
the sixteenth-century Castilian Carmelite, is known as reformer of his order, as
theologian, as mystic, and as sublime poet of divine love.
Both figures can be described, above all and specifically, as mystics: that is,
as practitioners of mysticism and, at the same time, as theoreticians of mysticism. There is shared by both one dominating concern and objective:
personal, experiential union with the transcendent Other, with the Absolute.
For both, furthermore, this concern is positively central to their writings, as it
was central to their historical lives. We propose to compare their respective
understandings of mysticism, beginning with their striking points in common
and continuing with their more subtle and more profound divergencies.
To begin with the most fundamental notions, both thinkers postulate or
believe in a Transcendent Other, an Absolute: for Plotinus, the One, to hen;
for John of the Cross, the God of Christian Revelation. It is this that is the
supreme reality, the cause of the universe, and the goal to which all things
aspire. Both mystics stress certain characteristics of this ultimate reality: that
it is one, simple, absolute, other, and, perhaps most importantly, transcendent.
The postulation of these qualities as divine attributes is to be expected in St.
John of the Cross, who falls squarely within the Judeo-Christian tradition. In
the case of Plotinus, however, the notion of the transcendence of the One
represents a surpassing of previous Greek ontology; 1 at the same time, it separates him from a number of schools of Eastern mysticism and from any
doctrine based upon purely pantheistic foundations. Thus this notion of the
transcendence of the supreme reality joins Plotinus and John of the Cross in
somewhat of a common tradition, while at the same time it separates them
sharply from a host of other forms of mysticism.
The next key notion on which these two thinkers should be compared is that
of the visible universe. In both it is conceived as derived from the transcendent Absolute in some way, whether by emanation or by creation, and as such
it is a reflection, however remote, of the perfections of the Absolute. In Plotinus' view, all things in the visible universe, the kosmos aisthetos, are formed
according to archetypes which belong to the Intelligible Universe, the Nom,
the sphere or dimension of the forms. 2 Material beings are only images of
their immensely more perfect archetypes, or logoi. However, the beauty of the
physical cosmos, as well as that of art, can serve as a starting point for the
uplifting and awakening of the soul, that it may gradually ascend, by moving
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from image to archetype, to the contemplation of intelligible forms and their
beauty. Though there are a number of differences to be found, an exemplarist
understanding of creation, derived in part from Platonic and Neoplatonic
sources, came to be the common property of most medieval Christian theologians. Exemplarist motifs thus make their appearance in a chain of thinkers,
being transmitted through such mystics as St. Augustine and Dionysius the
Pseudo-Areopagite, continuing to Sts. Francis and Bonaventure, arriving at
last to post-Renaissance John of the Cross. Not unlike his predecessors in the
medieval mystical tradition, John exclaims that creatures may be looked upon
"as a trace of the passing of God, whereby one can discern His grandeur,
power, and wisdom."3 And again, like both Plotinus and his more proximate
Christian predecessors, John of the Cross turns towards the wonder and
beauty of creatures as a means of being uplifted to the contemplation of
higher realities. The soul that wishes to advance in knowledge of God, he tells
us, must begin "by knowing and reflecting upon creatures, moving from these
to the knowledge of its Beloved, their Creator. For ... His grandeur and
excellence are known through them." 4
It is also appropriate that we compare the concept of the human soul in
both thinkers. Following Aristotle, the one as well as the other understands it
as the form of the body, as the vivifier of human malter. At the same time,
both consider it to be, as in Plato, immaterial and immortal. There are still
further points of commonality: both have been influenced by the Aristotelian
doctrine that the human mind becomes what it knows, which is the basis for
the conclusion that it has the capacity to assimilate any and all things.S In
Plotinus, this notion combines with the Stoic doctrine that the soul has the
ability to stretch itself boundlessly over the All, giving rise to the theory of the
"infinite self," according to which the individual soul can ascend to and assimilate the infinite contents of the Nous, the Intelligible World, or second
hypostasis, and even achieve union with the One. 6 The sixteenth-century
Spanish mystic, for his part, stresses that the human soul is characterized by a
certain elasticity by which different levels of interiority and spiritual receptivity
may be progressively actualized. In both thinkers the soul has unequivocally
one destiny, which is also its salvation: union with the transcendent Other, or
God. In Plot in us, in the words of one of his analysts, "the soul is an amphibian, a traveller [that] re-ascends through the power of dialectic to Intellect and
then by a process of purification, of utter simplification, arrives at the point of
contact with the pure and simple absolute, the One."7 In language not totally
foreign to this, the Spanish Carmelite describes the soul as a pilgrim in the
night: "[In1 order that the soul may reach the state of perfection," he writes,
"it must ordinarily undergo first two types of nights, which spiritual writers call
purgations or purifications of the soul. And here we call them nights, because
the soul, in the one as well as in the other, walks along in darkness, as at night.
The first night or purgation is that of the sensitive part of the soul ... and the
second is of the spiritual part ... ."8 In some of his texts, the metaphorical
night is extended to include a third part, which is the term of the ascent:
"These three parts of the night all constitute one night; but it has three parts
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like the night, because the first, which is the night of sense, is compared to the
evening twilight ... and the second, which is [the virtue ofl faith, is compared
to midnight, which is totally dark; and the third, which is [the experience of]
God, is compared to dawn .... "9
In both of the eminent mystics the objective is to bring the soul to union
with its transcendent source; and in both, likewise, the means to this end is an
arduous process of purification. Such a purification, which is central to any
doctrine of mysticism, is the next notion we must compare. Both of them
conceive of it as an ascent, a spiritual and mental movement from below
upwards, and from the contemplation of multiplicity to that of unity. The
ascent, at least in one of its dimensions, consists in a purification of the intellectual operations by progressive negations, in order that the perfections and
the utter simplicity of the source of being may be revealed. Interestingly,
though, both the pagan sage and the Christian saint insist that the ascent
cannot be exclusively intellectual but must be moral as well, that it requires
virtues and the achievement of moral perfections. Both thinkers acknowledge
the four cardinal virtues as foundational, to be supplemented or crowned by a
set of higher ones: in Plot in us, the same four cardinal virtues, no longer at the
"civic" but rather at the "purificative" level, the practice of which brings about
detachment from bodily illusions; in John of the Cross, the supernatural and
infused virtues of faith, hope, and charity. Again, in both mystics the element
of love is considered indispensable. Some force must impel the soul; something must move it forward on this rigorous ascent. In Plotinus the love in
question is termed eros, often translated as either "yearning" or "desire"; the
soul receives this love from the One and is in turn transformed, elevated, and
brought by the One to a similarity with it. The Christian mystic John of the
Cross, on the other hand, distinguishes between a natural passion for communion with God, which may be cultivated by choice and which would probably
correspond to the Plotinian eros, and the supernatural love of charity derived
from the theological virtue of the same name. While the first form of love
plays a preparatory role, it is the second love that effects the actual union of
the soul with God. Both these mystics, moreover, divide the ascent or process
of purification into various stages. Some striking parallels can be discerned in
their respective schema. In that of Plotinus, the ascent comprises three stages:
1) the overcoming of bodily sensations and desires, by which the state of
impassibility, or apatheia, is achieved; 2) the suppression of discursive reasoning - that is, of all ratiocination and any cognitive operations involving the
imagination; and 3) the surpassing of intelligible form, or the intuitive leap
from the Ideas in their diversity to the One in its unity. Plotinus' first stage
would correspond very clearly to John of the Cross' "active night of sense," in
which fundamentally the same goals are achieved. The last two stages in
Plotinus' development would both fall within what the Spanish mystic calls the
"active night: of spirit," in which the three powers of the soul- intellect, memory, and will-are purified simultaneously and in stages by negation of their
objects.
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There are also some striking coincidences to be remarked in the matter of
the mystical union itself. In both expositors, the soul and the Absolute
"become one"; not, however, by any ontological fusion of the two subjects, nor
by absorption of the human into the divine, such as two ethereal bodies might
be united. Rather, mystical communion is explained far more subtly as a oneness achieved in the intentional order by means of acts of knowing and loving,
and in particular through a cognitive act of intuition. Thus, if in this experience the soul "becomes" God or the Absolute, it is in the sense that the object
known determines the knowing subject intentionally by permeation of the
faculties. Both thinkers are indebted in their formulation of this phenomenon
to Aristotelian psychology, in which the mind has the capacity to become what
it knows. lO Another central characteristic in both articulations, the Plotinian
and the Sanjuanist, is that mystical union does not entail the loss of the soul's
self as a knowing and willing subject. It is particularly important to point this
out concerning Plotinus, who, not being a Christian, might be associated with
pantheistic forms of mysticism in which the highest level of achievement brings
about an annihilation or loss of self. In Plotinus, however, a metaphysical
identification of being and knowledge allows for the retention of the individual
knowing substance and the simultaneous intentional presence to it of differing
entities. In John of the Cross, similarly, to be human is to have a soul
endowed with the rational faculties of intellect, memory, and will. These
powers are never absorbed by any other subject nor eradicated in their operations; in mystical rapture, far to the contrary, they are elevated to unprece·
dented operative heights. It is also an interesting coincidence that both com·
mentators consider the mystical experience to have two dimensions, a cogni·
tive one and an affective one. As Plotinus says in the Enneads (VI, 7, 35), in
that divine trance the soul is at once sober and inebriated. Or, in Juan de la
Cruz's formulation, the ray of infused contemplation "is like a warm light ...
for it is an illumination that enamors jointly. . .. For, since God is divine light
and love, in the communication that He makes of Himself to the soul, He
equally informs the two powers, intellect and will, with knowledge and love." 11
The two outstanding mystics should be compared on one last fundamental
issue: the use of metaphors. It is commonplace among mystics of all cultures
to insist upon the otherness and ineffability of their peculiar experience. Seeing, however, that things of beauty from the physical cosmos are images or
reflections of the more perfect beyond, they find that metaphors can convey
adequately, though obliquely, something of their unfathomable venture. Both
Plotinus and John of the Cross are masters of the use of metaphors, and they
both employ them in passages overflowing with lyrical intensity. Plotinus
resorts to them especially to convey the strength and splendor of spiritual
realities: an example would be his statement that "the material universe floats
in Soul like a net in the sea."12 Juan de 11:1 Cruz, on the other hand, who is
recognized as the most sublime and excellent poet of the Spanish language,
builds his lyrics around a cluster of essential symbols: the hunt, the nuptials,
the night, the dawn, the flame, the fountain in the garden. Each one of these
archetypal realities he utilizes to represent the union of the soul with God, or
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the presence of God within the soul. Interestingly, there is no lack of
metaphors shared by the two mystics: from terms used in passing - such as
"vision," "contemplation," and "ecstasy" - to such central and sustained
images as that of the "ascent," used to illustrate the road to union, and that of
the "awakening" of the soul ("recuerdo" in John of the Cross), used to express
its achievement. In their common insistence upon the need for purification
and detachment of the will, there is a noticeable affinity in their formulation of
negative imperatives: while Plotinus concludes the Enneads V, 3 with his
categorical "Cut away everything," the treatises of the Spanish saint resound
with his emphatic "Nada, nada, nada .... "
The parallels are, no doubt, striking. Closer analysis will reveal, however,
that the approximation to Plotinus in the Spanish mystic represents more of a
conceptual and symbolic framework than a true coincidence in the manner of
understanding the essence of mysticism and its achievement. Despite the
palpable resemblances, it is safe to say that John of the Cross should not be
looked upon principally as a Christian Neoplatonist.
Next we shall confront the two doctrines in search of the divergencies.
Following the order we have established, we shall examine the disparities in
the concepts of God or the Absolute, the universe, the human being, the
purification or ascent, and the mystical union.
When speaking of the Absolute in Plotinus, one must distinguish between
the One, or first hypostasis, and its primal product, the Nous, Logos, or second
hypostasis. The One, or the Good (a name derived from Plato), is conceived
of by Plotinus not only as transcendent but as beyond being. It is also beyond
form, and therefore totally indeterminate. It is a reality more negative than
positive, more logical than ontological. Against Aristotle, who made the
divine intellect the first principle, Plotinus asserts that in the One there is no
consciousness or intellection; this is so, he maintains, because the One in its
absolute simplicity must be beyond the dichotomy of subject and object. The
first product of the One, the Nous, is the divine intellect, the world or sphere
of the forms. It is the realm of the divine properly speaking, for the One is
beyond divinity. The Nous is inferior to the One, following the law of diminishing causality that governs the emanationist universe of Plotinus. However,
many of the attributes denied of the One are affirmed of the Nous. The
second hypostasis is an ontologically positive reality: it is being, being at its
highest. It is specified by form, and it contains the forms or logoi or intelligible
archetypes for all inferior realities. The Nous is alive with cognitive activity,
for being is one with intellection; it is the sphere of the divinities, a host of
individual knowing subjects cognitively present to one another. Needless to
say, this Plotinian emanationist cosmos with its proliferation of divinities has
little to do with the triune Christian God of St. John of the Cross. Ironically,
though, there may be some historical link between the understanding of the
one and thilt of the other, for early Christian Neoplatonists were influenced by
Plotinus' thought on the One and its derivatives in their reflections upon the
divine processions and the Trinity. One such speculator was fourth-century
Marius Victorinus, whose thought was later improved upon by his con tempo-
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rary St. Augustine. At any rate, in the Christian theologian John of the Cross,
God is not beyond being; He is, rather, the fullness of being. He is not merely
logical, but metaphysically positive as well; He is infinite, but not indeterminate; He is omniscient and ever-conscious. In the manner of generation there
is some remote resemblance with Plotinus, for in both bodies of thought the
first procession from the Absolute is occasioned by an act of contemplative
intellection, and that which proceeds - in Plotinus, the Nous; in the Carmelite
theologian, the second trinitarian Person - is in its very essence intellective.
However, the Christian God does not generate His inferior, but rather eternally generates and spirates His equal. It is when He creates "ex nihilo" that
He produces something inferior.
This leads us to the divergencies in the two authors regarding the understanding of the visible or created universe. Plotinus stresses that the One is
transcendent. However, as all things emanate from it through a chain of
descending hypostases, there is a certain continuity between the higher and
the lower. Each hypostasis is significantly inferior to the prior; nonetheless,
there is no sharp ontological break in the entire descent. For this reason,
along the descending chain, the lower contains the higher in some latent or
virtual mode. In the depths, there is a kinship and a substantial identity
between the human soul and the higher cosmic realities. The One, Plotinus
tells us, "holds sway by all reason over a dense offspring of its own, a host that
shares its divinity."13 This explains how knowledge of the divine is possible: it
is contained by the soul virtually or latently. In John of the Cross, on the other
hand, God creates "ex nihilo," and this very concept grounds a radical disproportionality between God and creatures. The consequence of this, looking at
it "from above," is that in John of the Cross-to put it simply-God is far
more transcendent than in Plotinus. And looking at it "from below," it means
that the essence of created things does not contain even virtually or seminally
a share in God's nature; the human being is nol divine. The discontinuity
carries over into the realm of human knowledge: as creatures are disproportionate to God, likewise human cognition in terms of creatures, no matter how
lofty, is disproportionate to God. Much unlike Plotinus, John of the Cross
insists that one cannot know God or become united with Him by the operation
of one's cognitive faculties as they are given in nature.
Moving on to the structure of human nature, for Plotinus man is composed
of two distinct entities: body and soul. More than a composite, the human
being is an ensemble built in layers. Souls pre-exist their existence in time.
They dwell in and are part of the third hypostasis: psyche, Universal Soul. The
higher part of the soul participates in Nous, or Intellect, although it has the
capacity to descend to lower hypostases. Due to a certain "original sin" committed by some souls, there is a "fall" to the sensible world. The soul then
informs matter. Its union with a particular body, however, is rather accidental;
for it has the capacity, at another moment in time, to inform another one.
Nonetheless, it is only the lower part of the soul which thus "falls"; the higher
part continues to dwell permanently within the third hypostasis, having no
contact with the sensible; the lower soul, or the body. Structurally, therefore,
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the human being is built on two different planes. First there is the "true self,"
the contemplative and rational part, which is perpetually illuminated by Intellect and not involved in temporal life; this self cannot suffer, sin, or be ignorant. Then there is the "other self," formed by the bodily organism. An irradiation from the higher soul, this self is in communication with the sensible
world; it suffers passions and ignorance, and it dwells in its body as in a prison.
Our sixteenth-century Carmelite would find this description of the human
being almost unrecognizable. In matters pertaining to philosophical anthropology, John of the Cross was fundamentally Aristotelian, having studied the
Stagirite both directly and through Thomas Aquinas. Historically, this is not at
all surprising, given that he received his intellectual formation at the University of Salamanca in the decade of the 1560's, the heyday of the Silver Age of
Scholasticism. For Juan de la Cruz, there is no pre-existence, transmigration,
or reincarnation of souls. The soul is the substantial form of one particular
body. Further, body and soul constitute a composite, or a unity in one supposit. 14 Body and soul are components of an integrated whole. The soul
dwells in and with the body, in isolation from which it cannot operate. It is not
empowered to think or contemplate independently; nor can it effect a metaphysical or mystical flight of its own. Being a spiritual substance in which there
are neither higher nor lower parts, the entire soul is in communion with the
body it informs; being, further, the seat or principle of the composite's rational
operations, the soul is in immediate contact with all things perceived, known,
remembered, or desired by the subject. In John of the Cross the soul is a
markedly historical and incarnate reality and never ceases to be so. Some
might think this anthropology to be antagonistic to mystical ascent. We will
see, however, that this thinker does reconcile this anthropology with mystical
theology.
For now, though, let us focus upon the understanding of human knowledge
in Plotinus and in John of the Cross, particularly since the two agree that
mystical union takes place in the intentional order. In Plotinus' view, the
highest degree of cognitive activity is that of contemplation of the forms and
intellectual principles. The higher portion of the soul performs this activity of
its own accord, by virtue of its kinship with the Nous, or Universal Intellect. 15
The subsequently lower level of noetic activity is that of rational or discursive
reasoning. It is performed by a correspondingly lower portion of the soul, that
called the rational soul, which belongs to the realm of psyche, or Universal
Soul. It has derived its intellectual principles from the Nous; but being lesser
in perfection, its cognitive act is no longer contemplative or intuitive but
discursive. 16 At the lowest level of cognitive operations lie the activities of
perception and memory. These two are seen as acts of the soul, as operations
set in motion and radiating forth from it, and not as impressions received from
its objects.l 7 According to Plotinus' epistemology, then, in the order of operations the initiative always comes from above, by a higher portion of the soul
illuminating a lower one. The One, the Nous, the Universal Soul are constantly shedding their rays of illumination upon our individual souls, a fact
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which we discover in philosophical reflection. Our knowledge always comes
from above and from within; in no way is it derived from sense perception.
This entire schema is virtually inverted in John of the Cross' view of human
cognition. His psychology of knowledge is Aristotelian in its basic contours.
As such, sensation sets in motion the cognitive process, and all subsequent
noetic operations are dependent upon it: "As the philosophers say, the soul,
when God infuses it into the body, is like a smooth, blank tablet upon which
nothing is painted; and, except for that which it experiences through the
senses, nothing is communicated to it, in the course of nature, from any other
source."18 In the process of cognition, perception leads to the production of
phantasms or sensible images, which are indispensable for the operations of
the intellect. 19 The active intellect then abstracts the intelligible form from
the sensible image, which in turn activates and informs the passive intellect. It
is this latter faculty that performs the actions of intellection and judgment
properly speaking. We are dealing here with an understanding of knowledge
in which the process of cognition begins outside the person and then proceeds
to move inward and upward. It is an epistemology which does not admit any
form of innatism and which, while recognizing the mind's infinite capacity to
know, holds that it can have no fully imageless, formless thoughts. Here again,
John of the Cross' philosophical positions would seem to preclude any cognitive experience of a mystical nature.
Turning to the question of the mystical ascent to God, we shall see that here
the divergencies become even more pronounced. In Plotinus the process of
purification, or katharsis, is essentially dialectical, coming about by means of
gradual suppressions of intelligible differences until the soul at last attains the
simplicity and unity of the One. It is an ascent effected by metaphysical
knowledge and thus barred from those individuals unable to obtain this particular intellectual discipline; nonphilosophers, in fact, are precluded from
reaching any of the three highest hypostases - Universal Soul, the Nous, or the
One. Further, this ascent is brought about by an introvertive reflective gaze,
which seeks to discover in the depths of the self the divinity that is latently
present. In Plotinus' words, "The soul once seen to be thus precious, thus
divine, you may hold the faith by its possession you are already nearing God:
in the strength of this power make upwards toward Him: at no great distance
you must attain: there is not much between."20 In another passage: "To find
ourselves is to know our source."21 This introvertive motion is at once a reversion-a return to one's principle-and, since the principle is superior, an
elevation. A direct and fundamental consequence is that in Plotinus no practice of religion is involved or necessary, or even recommended. There are no
prayers, no sacraments, no rituals. This stems in part from the soul/body
dichotomy, in which the actions of the latter have absolutely no impact upon
the former. It is also rooted in the self-sufficicm.:y and essential divinity of the
soul. As Paul Henry formulated it,
(In PlotinusJ salvation is not to be achieved. It is achieved. For its realization it is enough
that one should become conscious of what one already is in one's inmost nature, where
Inlellt'(1 whkh is ""yond llie vinut's idenlifies ilself with true being and with the idea which
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one forms of the self, of the world, and of God. The anchoritism of the soul and of God
exclude at once all sacramentalism and all true history of becoming. The latent actuality of
salvation and the cold transcendence of God make it impossible, in· terms of Plotinian
Socratism, to conceive of any genuine doctrine of grace. 22

This citation certainly introduces the contrast which we must proceed to
make. In John of the Cross, introvertive reflection and self-knowledge are
definitely indispensable, but they are only preparatory disciplinary exercises.
The object of the ascent is not the self. It is unquestionably other, another: it
is God. However, as there is an ontological abyss between the human being
and God, the latter is not accessible to the former in one's natural state; more
specifically, one's rational faculties cannot attain God as an object of their
operations. In the order of nature, no amount of reflection or thought or even
meditation can yield the slightest glimpse of God in His true essence. God can
be attained only in the supernatural order, as a supernatural object and by
supernatural means. The means is grace, which is merited by Christ and
distributed sacramentally. Thus we see that for John of the Cross, not only is
mysticism inherently bound up with religious faith, it is intrinsically Christocentric and sacramental as well. We ascend towards our mystical destiny by
means of prayer, natural and supernatural virtues, the sacraments, grace.
We have seen that in Plotinus mystical ascent is essentially cognitive. In the
mysticism of John of the Cross the role of the noetic is no less important, but it
is more complex and somewhat paradoxical. The term of mystical ascent is
unquestionably the contemplative vision of God; in beatitude this intuitive
gaze will be fullest and clearest, while the cognitive act at the summit of the
mystical union in time is an image of that higher fruition. 23 The ascent,
however, is not realized by any form of natural knowledge, nor by any
academic discipline or "science," not even that of theOlogy. In fact, the
content of these various bodies of human knowledge must be implacably
denied as means of union with God. For "anything that the imagination can
conceive and the intellect can grasp and understand in this life is not and
cannot be the proximate means for union with God. . .. For all that the intellect ... can understand ... is most unlike Him .... "24 The only available
means for bridging the chasm are the theological virtues; they are effective by
reason of being supernatural and having proportionality with the end. In the
order of the actual operations, the communion between the soul and God is
initiated by the virtue of faith and is perfected and completed by the remaining
theological virtues of charity and hope. The infused virtue of (aith makes the
object present to the intellect and communicates it to the soul supernaturally:
faith "gives and communicates God Himself to us, hidden beneath a silvery
surface.... "25 What is called (or, then, is an "affirmation of all the powers ...
in pure faith,"26 which is "the sale proximate and proportionate means for the
soul to be united with God ...; and therefore, the greater is the faith in the
soul, the more closely it is united to God."27 The essence of the faith is in
itself infinite in luminosity and intelligibility. However, and here lies one of
the paradoxes, it is "a dark night to the soul,"28 due to "our weak intellects,
which become darkened and frustrated in so vast a light."29 The subject is
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admonished to proceed under the exclusive guidance of the light of faith,
which means to proceed in darkness. "Faith... contains within itself the
divine light."30 Thus, by augmenting the amount of supernatural faith and by
dispelling all disproportionate semblances of God, the ray of infused contemplation becomes visible, the object of faith becomes progressively manifest to
the intellect. Self-imposed darkness leads to light; the night of faith leads to
the dawn of mystical illumination.
Earlier we spoke of John of the Cross' "epistemological realism," his theory
of knowledge in which sensation is the first step of the knowing process and in
which all cognition is tied to phantasms. He is able to maintain such a position
while affirming also the reality of mystical knowledge because mystical noetic
acts are infused and therefore extraordinary. Interestingly, though, the
numerous forms of "supernatural apprehensions of the intellect" which he
discusses in his treatises are carefully detailed and explained within the framework of his realist theory of knowledge. 31 Typically, infused acts of knowledge
are explicated in terms of suspension of the lower stages of the cognitive
process while the integrity of the remaining stages is retained and respected.
An infused communication might, for example, be made directly to the internal senses of fantasy and imagination, bypassing the external senses. Once this
extraordinary apprehension is received, the process of knowledge follows its
normal course. The internal powers confect a "sensible species," from which
the active intellect abstracts an "intelligible species," which is then understood
by the passive intellect; the content of the apprehension is retained in memory
and is subject to recall, as in ordinary knowledge. An immensely more perfect
supernatural communication might be made, free of images, directly to the
passive intellect; in this case all the lower stages of the cognitive processexternal and internal perception, the formation of phantasms, and the operation of the active intellect-would be bypassed. The highest mystical communications take place in this way, from pure spirit to pure spirit, "stripped of
accidents and phantasms."32
Finally, we must point to some central divergencies in the notion of the
mystical union itself. In Plotinus' presentation the summit of mystical realization appears as an experience which is beyond any and all virtues. Even at the
lower stages of existence, neither virtue nor vice affects the soul intrinsically;
the function of virtue, at most, is to remove accretions which have accidentally
accrued to it. At the apex of mystical union there is no virtuous action, only
contemplation: for the Good or One itself is beyond virtue. A particular irony
of Plotinus' doctrine is that despite the fact that the ascent is dialectical and
cognitive, the highest pinnacle of mystical experience is bereft of consciousness. Within his mystical schema, when the level of contemplation reached is
that of the Nous, which is Intellection itself, the soul is fully conscious; it is
experiencing, indeed, the plenitude of cognitive activity. This degree of
contemplation tends to be the resting place bf mystical souls, both during their
lifetime and after death. However, in those rare, fleeting moments in which
the soul attains union with the One, the experience is devoid of consciousness.
Emphatically he states that "the Principle transcending Being has no intellec-
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tual act."33 In fact, "[the Good and First Principle] possesses nothing: it will
therefore have no intellection."34 Following upon the lack of consciousness of
the One, and upon the fact that knowledge comes from an illumination of the
lower by the higher, "awareness of this Principle comes neither by knowing nor
by the Intellection that discovers the Intellectual Beings but by a presence
overpassing all knowledge. In knowing, soul or mind abandons its unity....
Our way then takes us beyond knowing .... "35 At this supreme stage, what
takes place is, in effect, communion of a dehumanized soul with a first principle totally devoid of personal character.
Here again, Plotinus' and John of the Cross' formulations are unrecognizable to one another. Regarding the question as to whether there is consciousness in mystical union, the Carmelite thinker stresses that the term of the
ascent is the crystal-clear vision of beatitude, the highest mystical stage attainable in this life being a foretaste, a prelude. This being so, as a cognitive act it
is not clear; but it is not dark either, as is the mystical night. Standing between
the two extremes, it is "a tranquil night, at the onset of the rise of dawn."36
The ray of contemplation is described as "a serene and limpid light,"37 by
means of which "God communicates to the soul certain half-obscure glimpses
of His divine beauty.... "38 And further, in that transfiguring union it is said
that the subject discovers God's infinite attributes, referred to in the Living
Flame as "lamps of fire" which "give forth knowledge and love of God,"
enlightening and enkindling the soul "within their splendors." 39
Much unlike Plotinus, Juan de la Cruz sees the virtues as performing a
pivotal role at the apex of mystical communion. As stated earlier, the feat of
communion with God is not accomplished by the unaided strength of the
subject, nor by the natural capacities of one's rational powers, but by the
theological virtues which perfect the latter and infuse into them the life of
God. The virtue of hope purifies the memory of its natural contents. The
virtue of faith perfects the intellect, bringing it to attain God cognitively. And
the virtue of charity perfects the will, enabling it to perform a proportionate
act of love. The theological virtues are so indispensable and so intimately
involved that they themselves can be looked upon as the bond of union. Their
function is, in tum, linked with the trinitarian character of John of the Cross'
mysticism; and here we are at the antipode of cold Neoplatonic impersonalism. By the virtue of faith the soul comes to share in the Divine Intellect; that
is, to participate in the act of generation of the Son by the Father. By the
virtue of charity, the subject shares in God's own Act of Love, which is one and
the same as the spiration of the Holy Spirit. The third theological virtue,
hope, is correlated in union with the divine nature in a generic way. Thus,
mystical communion is an indwelling of the Trinity in the soul "enlightening its
intellect in the wisdom of the Son, delighting its will in the Holy Spirit, and
absorbing it powerfully and mightily in the abysmal embrace of the sweetness
of the Father."4o
We can conclude our exploratory remarks by pointing out that while Plotinus and John of the Cross can both be legitimately looked upon as mystics, we
are dealing here with two very heterogeneous realities. On the one hand we
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have the learned, serene, impassible pagan sage, wrapped up in the mystical
contemplation of ever simpler metaphysical realities; on the other, the austere
friar, learned but unreliant upon his erudition, on fire with divine love, transfigured by charity, his senses often suspended in rapture. There are unquestionably traces of Plotinus' magnificent schema in the thought of John of the
Cross. But they are not much more than traces. After all, the historical
transmission from the one to the other was not direct. It took place by way of
Dionysius the Pseudo-Areopagite, who had received the Neoplatonic heritage
from the Athenian Pl'oclus, within whose elaborate framework he inserted
Christian doctrine. It is Dionysius and St. Augustine, along with a number of
Franciscan mystics influenced by both of them, who represent the direct Neoplatonic influences on John of the Cross. Thus it was that the latter received a
Ncoplatonic legacy which had undergone several phases of Christianization.
The result of this distance, in combination with numerous other factors, is that
there is a substantial difference between the two modes of living and conceptualizing mysticism. Based on this difference, we may look upon Plotinus,
without in any way wishing to minimize the awesomeness of his figure, as a
"Prince of Natural Mysticism," in contrast to St. John of the Cross, who can
unequivocally be termed a "Prince of Christian and Supernatural Mysticism."
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